The allegations against Manchester City FC have become the most contentious issue in world football recently. In the early morning hours of September 29 Beijing time, British newspaper The Independent published an analysis column examining the deep-rooted reasons behind Manchester City FC's alleged financial irregularities.

After the initial shock, the repercussions have continued. Typically, as the Manchester City FC saga enters its third day, the debate has shifted from the events themselves to discussions about the rules being violated. Some argue these rules are "unfair." Others contend they were designed to prevent challengers from disrupting the "established order." Still others claim the rules were created by an "alliance of vested interests."

These widespread views have been reinforced over time by public campaigns and ambitious club owners eager to display their ambitions, continuously amplifying these sentiments.

Consequently, numerous rumors and misinformation have spread about the rules originally called Financial Fair Play (FFP). Nearly everyone views the situation from a top-down perspective, concerned only with who wins.

Because of these myths, it is crucial to see the truth—these rules actually emerged from the football landscape of the turn of the century, and that history holds important lessons for today. At that time, unlimited team spending created enormous pressure on the football system, with many clubs nearing collapse and ordinary employees struggling to receive wages. The real impact extended far beyond who won trophies.

In the years following the Bosman ruling in 1996, concerned UEFA officials witnessed uncontrolled spending in the open market trigger an arms race, pushing numerous clubs toward insolvency. Wage bills consumed alarming percentages of club revenues. Many clubs across Europe defaulted on transfer fees and even player wages. The situation at the time was described as the "Wild West."

Addressing this problem was the original motivation behind the concept of "fairness."

UEFA's initial response was an attempt to implement strict salary caps in 1999, but this conflicted with European labor law. The organization's technical leaders, mostly Nordic, also recognized that a legal framework needed to be established first. They began gathering data, which ultimately led to club licensing requirements and Financial Fair Play regulations. These became conditions clubs had to meet to participate in European competitions, promoting responsible management.

While all this was happening, Leeds United began experiencing severe financial difficulties due to overspending—precisely the kind of behavior UEFA was trying to control—underscoring the need for change. Meanwhile, Roman Abramovich's takeover of Chelsea in 2003 introduced entirely new pressures on the system. Even Ferran Soriano, Manchester City FC's current CEO, described the move as a "major disruption" that sparked "rampant inflation spreading throughout football." This pull from above created a wage-spiral at every level.

Other clubs not only had to spend more to sign players; crucially, they had to spend more to retain them.

Those involved in drafting FFP recounted stories from leagues like Ireland and the Czech Republic, not to mention English lower divisions, where players couldn't afford Christmas gifts because they hadn't been paid. For this reason, the importance of these rules extended far beyond whether clubs actually went bankrupt, especially in an industry awash with vast sums of money. As one official put it, "Those stories have always stayed with me."

Some form of cost control is necessary, particularly if you believe in the football pyramid concept. All this occurred before state funding inflated spending even further. The competitive nature of sport means this will always be challenging, because everyone simply wants to win.

But there is a natural contradiction here. German clubs would complain to UEFA that they faced far stricter regulations than their competitors in England or Spain.

Platini, who became UEFA president in 2007, sympathized with German clubs' concerns. The legendary French midfielder recognized from the outset that France's DNCG (National Directorate of Control and Management) had the strictest financial control system.

The desire to expand this approach across Europe, coupled with wage-cap proposals, ultimately led to FFP—an indirect salary cap. This move toward careful regulation also made it logical to link spending to revenue, particularly since football itself generates enormous income. Platini received crucial support from Joaquín Almunia, the European Commission's competition commissioner and an Athletic Bilbao fan—a club exemplifying self-sufficiency.

After UEFA eventually implemented FFP, the Premier League reasonably followed suit. After all, clubs compete in the same tournaments. The Premier League even set slightly relaxed rules for owner investment to ensure UEFA prize money wouldn't permanently trap or exclude certain clubs from competition.

All this led to a clear argument, one frequently raised today. As some have repeatedly pointed out forcefully to UEFA officials, there is an inherent risk in all this: maintaining the status quo forever, ensuring the highest-revenue clubs always remain on top.

This argument isn't wrong in itself, but it misses the point. It doesn't critique the rules, which are fundamentally just necessary cost-control mechanisms. What it actually critiques is the economic system and money flow.

Ultimately, sports generate sufficient revenue on their own. They don't need additional capital injections, particularly at Premier League or Champions League level.

What big clubs should be questioned about is this: over the past 40 years, nearly every decision in football has resulted in them receiving more money—from broadcasting rights to Champions League prize money. That is the real "established order."

In fact, FFP should have come with far stronger revenue-distribution mechanisms from the start. It's absurd this problem was never addressed. Especially considering that English football was historically the model for this, throughout most of its history before the 1990s.

Now there is a version of all this: the Premier League's new "squad cost ratio" rule, which lacks a crucial mechanism for anchoring—meaning the wealthiest clubs' spending can only be set as a fixed multiple of the poorest clubs' spending.

Finding a solution to this and ensuring more balanced competitive capacity distribution would benefit the sport overall, not just certain wealthy-owner clubs.

If someone designed sport from scratch, no one would think it wise to hand competitions to the powerful, sovereign wealth funds, or private equity groups. No one would think you need to find a rich "sugar daddy" to win. In other words, it's merely a shortcut.

This also illustrates why imagining alternatives is valuable. What would sport look like without such rules, or if they were substantially relaxed? You wouldn't see more competition—you'd see less. Football would fall under increasing control of the richest people. Everyone else would go bankrupt trying to keep up.

In other words, it would resemble the pre-2006 situation but with higher inflation and greater risk.

Though this wasn't the rules' original intent, attempting to manage the scale of resources football cannot sustain clearly makes sense. Otherwise, who could compete against state money?

Another crucial perspective comes from clubs often overlooked in such discussions. They pursue organic growth, like Brighton & Hove Albion, Athletic Bilbao, and even Tottenham Hotspur FC.

Tottenham Hotspur FC may seem like one of the "Big Six" often dismissed in these conversations, but they joined that group through solid macroeconomic management over many years.

With such diligence, Tottenham Hotspur FC should be challenging for titles and potentially winning trophies, but they have been hindered by cheating. In the 2016-17 season, they lost to Chelsea, which was later punished for financial irregularities. In multiple other seasons under Manchester City FC's investigation, Tottenham Hotspur FC was precisely squeezed out of the top four. How different might their trajectory and future opportunities be if they consistently qualified for the Champions League?

All this makes it worthwhile to view these rules from a different perspective.

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