Manchester United have recorded two draws and one defeat in their last three league matches and were eliminated from the League Cup after losing to Brighton. The Athletic published an article stating that Carrick's problems at Manchester United are remarkably similar to those Solskjaer faced when in charge: the lack of a distinct playing style and the absence of a Plan B.

Since Carrick was appointed interim manager of Manchester United in January, external observers have inevitably compared him to a former manager of the club.

Seven years earlier, Solskjaer also took over the team as interim manager. At that time, Manchester United again chose a decorated former player from the Ferguson era to lead the team, with the aim of boosting morale and stabilizing the situation.

Like Solskjaer, after Carrick improved the team's performance and dispelled the gloom over several months, his interim appointment was made permanent. Now, as with Solskjaer's situation at the start of the 2021-2022 season, the team's performance is struggling, and external voices criticize the club for retaining a manager purely out of sentiment, unable to elevate the team to the next level.

But is it fair to view Carrick as "Solskjaer 2.0"? Do the similarities in their managerial careers suggest that their destinies at Manchester United will ultimately be the same?

The similarities between the two are striking. Both expressed a desire for the team to play fast counter-attacking football, reminiscent of the great Manchester United team they played for. Their brilliant playing careers, combined with their understanding of the club's traditions, helped them lift morale in difficult times, both among supporters and in the dressing room.

Carrick told the club's media in January: "I hope we can play very entertaining football, be proactive, release creativity and ignite passion on the pitch. I want to feel excited watching from the sideline."

This can be compared to what Solskjaer said in a 2020 interview with The Athletic, discussing his team-building philosophy: "Of course, we look at all the history of Manchester United. We are an attacking team that needs to rely on quick players to launch quick counter-attacks."

Another similarity is that neither is willing to publicly criticize their players, and both have received praise for the improvements their players made under their management. Carrick's development of Mainoo is an example; during Solskjaer's time, Pogba's form also saw significant improvement. These qualities earned them the affection of supporters, but the dilemma Carrick faces is that he is now receiving not only the praise Solskjaer enjoyed, but also the same criticism.

The main criticism is that this Manchester United team lacks a distinct "style identity" and relies too heavily on counter-attacking play. This view is not unfounded. Data shows that after Solskjaer replaced Mourinho in December 2018, Manchester United's frequency of quick counter-attacks increased steadily; and after Carrick took over mid-season last year, this metric increased again.

In Carrick's first match against Manchester City, Mbeumo's goal was a perfect example of this counter-attacking style. However, when the two teams met again a few weeks ago, the situation was completely different: the opposition was down to ten men and defending deep, while Manchester United struggled to break them down. This exposed the precise deficiencies of this tactical system: the lack of a reliable Plan B, which was also a major challenge for Solskjaer at the time.

However, the view that the former Norwegian striker completely lacked tactical flexibility and acumen is too one-sided. Solskjaer had several matches where his specific strategies were highly effective, such as the 6-2 victory against Leeds United in December 2020, where his tactics successfully dismantled Bielsa's man-marking system. He also used a three-center-back formation with wing-backs to increase the team's offensive and defensive transition threat, a strategy that worked against opponents like Manchester City, Chelsea, and Liverpool.

But as soon as opponents pressed high and cut off Manchester United's counter-attacking routes, Solskjaer struggled to find a way to break the deadlock. The 2020-2021 Europa League final was a classic example: Manchester United controlled most of the possession but never managed to break down Emery's Villarreal. The match ended in a 1-1 draw, and they ultimately lost on penalties, resulting in an exhausting contest.

After several months of observation, Carrick's Manchester United is sharp in counter-attacks, but as soon as opponents press the space, the team's attack stalls. Opponents have also discovered this pattern, and the old problems Solskjaer faced are now resurfacing with Carrick. Last week in the League Cup, Brighton used a five-at-the-back formation at Old Trafford and ultimately won the match, which is a typical example.

The similarities do not end there. This season, Manchester United's high pressing has been ineffective, making their defense more susceptible to exposure, a problem Solskjaer also encountered. Of course, the situations are not entirely identical: during Solskjaer's time, the central issue was that forward Cristiano Ronaldo did not fit the high-pressing system; under Carrick, problems appear more frequently in their defending without possession, where the flanks are prone to being exposed.

It is important to note that it was not only these two who failed to make Manchester United's pressing effective: Ten Hag also created defensive vulnerabilities when attempting to implement intense pressing.

Carrick was a central member of Solskjaer's coaching staff, so their training philosophies are highly aligned, and it is unsurprising that the former English midfielder is encountering the same difficulties his former manager faced. But, as some commentators suggest, this does not mean Carrick is destined to fail.

Is there something inherently wrong with counter-attacking football? Counter-attacks cannot be the team's only weapon, but the notion that "only possession-based play is the right way" is equally debatable.

As shown in the table above, the average possession percentage of Premier League champions has declined significantly in the last two seasons. Compared to Solskjaer's time at Manchester United, quick counter-attacks are now more prevalent in the Premier League. There is still room for counter-attacking in top leagues, and it is valued even more than in Solskjaer's era. Players under Carrick have proven their ability to create lethal threats through counter-attacks.

There is nothing wrong with incorporating counter-attacks into one's tactical system; the real hidden danger lies in the team's lack of alternative solutions when opponents cut off the counter-attacking channels. Solskjaer always struggled to find a way to break the deadlock, but this does not mean Carrick will follow the same path.

Carrick has several tools at his disposal that could address the challenges posed by deep defending. Mainoo's ability to play penetrating passes is constantly improving; the summer signing Baldeba is returning to midfield after recovering from injury during the international break, which could ease the pressure on Mainoo and allow him to take on more organizational and creative tasks. The positional flexibility shown by Carrick's forwards indicates that the team has players capable of positional rotation and intricate passing combinations, sufficient to create space against compact defenses.

Manchester United's performance at the beginning of this season has generated significant criticism, and these doubts are reasonable; comparing Carrick's current situation with Solskjaer's past experiences is also valid. However, it would be premature to conclude that the current manager has no chance of finding solutions.

So far, Carrick's journey as a manager at Manchester United has inadvertently mirrored that of his former teammate and ex-manager. He deserves the opportunity to prove he possesses sufficient tactical wisdom to overcome the difficulties that led to Solskjaer's downfall.

Traduzido por IA.

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