Recently, allegations against Manchester City have become the hottest topic in football. On the early morning of September 29, Beijing Time (CEST), English newspaper The Independent published a column analyzing the deep reasons behind Manchester City's financial violations.

After the shock, its negative impact continues to reverberate. Usually, by the third day of each new phase in Manchester City's eight-year saga, debate surrounding the events themselves transforms into debate about the rules that were broken. Some call these rules "unfair"; others say they are designed to prevent challengers from disrupting the "existing order"; and still others claim they were created by a "coalition of interests."

These views, which are now widely discussed, have long been shaped by public opinion, and club investors, in their efforts to demonstrate "ambition," continually fuel this momentum.

As a result, numerous rumors and misinformation have spread around these rules, originally known as Financial Fair Play (FFP), with people viewing them almost exclusively from the perspective of who can win.

Because of these myths, it becomes more important to look at the reality: these rules were actually born from the football environment at the turn of the century, and that history serves as an important warning for today. At that time, uncontrolled club spending placed enormous pressure on the football system, with many clubs on the brink of collapse and ordinary employees going unpaid. The real impact far exceeded who won trophies.

In the years following the Bosman ruling in 1995, more responsible figures at UEFA were deeply concerned. Unregulated spending in the transfer market triggered an arms race, pushing more and more clubs toward financial ruin. Player wages as a percentage of revenue were extremely high. Many clubs across Europe failed to pay transfer installments and even player salaries, with the situation at the time described as the "Wild West."

And resolving this problem was the original intent behind "fairness."

UEFA's initial response was an attempt to introduce strict salary caps in 1999, but this violated European labour law. The organization's technocratic leadership, largely composed of Nordic figures, also recognized the need to establish a legal framework first, and began gathering information, which eventually led to the Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations. These were essentially conditions clubs had to meet to participate in European competitions, thereby encouraging prudent financial management.

While all this was unfolding, Leeds United began its financial decline precisely because of the type of excessive spending UEFA was trying to curb, further highlighting the need for change. At the same time, Chelsea's acquisition by Roman Abramovich in 2003 brought new pressure to the system. Even Manchester City's current CEO, Ferran Soriano, called that move a "massive disruption," causing "mad inflation spreading throughout football."This pull from the top caused wage increases to cascade through the entire pyramid.

Other clubs not only had to spend more money to buy players, but more importantly, they had to spend more to keep them.

Those involved in designing FFP remembered stories from leagues in Ireland, the Czech Republic, and the lower leagues in England, where players couldn't even afford Christmas gifts because they weren't being paid. For this reason, the significance of these rules transcends whether a club actually goes bankrupt, especially in an industry flooded with vast sums of money. As one official put it: "Those stories always stayed with me."

Some form of cost control is essential, especially if you believe in the football pyramid concept. And all this occurred before state-backed capital brought even faster inflation. The competitive nature inherent in sport means this will always be a challenge, because everyone just wants to win.

But there is an inherent contradiction here. German clubs would complain to UEFA that they faced far stricter regulations than their counterparts in England or Spain.

Platini, who became UEFA president in 2007, understood German clubs' concerns. The legendary French midfielder recognized early on that France's National Management and Control Board (DNCG) had the strictest financial regulation system. His desire to expand this approach across Europe, combined with salary cap proposals, ultimately led to FFP – an indirect salary cap. This shift toward prudent regulation also made it logical to link spending to revenue, especially given the vast sums of money generated by football itself. Platini also received crucial support from European Commission Competition Commissioner Joaquín Almunia. Almunia was a fan of Athletic Bilbao, a club that served as a model of self-sufficiency.

And once UEFA finally implemented FFP, it made sense for the Premier League to follow suit. After all, clubs compete in the same competitions. The Premier League even made the rules slightly more lenient in allowing owners to invest, to ensure that UEFA prize money wouldn't permanently lock certain clubs out of the elite.

All this led to a clear counterargument, which is now frequently raised. As someone repeatedly and forcefully pointed out to UEFA officials, this inherently carries a risk: to maintain the status quo forever, allowing the highest-revenue clubs to always stay at the top.

This argument itself is not invalid, but it misses the mark. It is not criticizing the rules – which are essentially just necessary cost control mechanisms. What it really criticizes is the economic system and flow of money.

After all, the money generated by the sport itself is already more than sufficient. There is no real need for additional investment, especially at the Premier League or Champions League level.

What should be questioned about big clubs in this regard is: over 40 years, almost every decision in football has resulted in them receiving more money, from broadcast rights to Champions League prize money. That is the actual "existing order."

In fact, FFP should have been accompanied by a far better redistribution mechanism from the start. It makes no sense that this issue was never addressed, especially considering that English football was largely a model in this regard for most of its history before the 1990s.

Currently, this is even being replicated: the Premier League's new "squad cost ratio" rule, without the crucial restraining mechanism – where the spending of the richest clubs can only be set as a fixed multiple of the poorest clubs.

Finding a way to solve this problem and ensure a more balanced distribution of talent would also benefit the sport as a whole, not just a few clubs with wealthy owners.

If someone designed the sport from scratch, no one would think it a good idea to hand competitive advantage to oligarchs, sovereign wealth funds, or private equity groups; no one would think you need to find a rich "sugar daddy" to win. In other words, it's just a shortcut.

This also suggests that imagining alternative solutions would be very helpful. What would it look like if the sport had no such rules, or if those rules were greatly relaxed? You wouldn't see more intense competition, but less, because football would become increasingly tied to the richest. Everyone else would go bankrupt trying to keep up.

In other words, it would be like the situation before 2006, but with even worse inflation and greater risks.

While this was not the original intent of the rules, the effort to manage the scale of resources that football cannot afford to ignore clearly makes sense. If not, who could compete with state capital?

Another key perspective comes from a group of clubs often overlooked in such discussions. They seek organic growth, like Brighton, Athletic Bilbao, and even Tottenham Hotspur.

Tottenham Hotspur may be one of the "Big Six" often mocked in such discussions, but they earned their place through sound macroeconomic management over many years.

With that diligence, Tottenham Hotspur could have defied expectations and even won titles, but were thwarted by cheating. In the 2016-17 season, they lost to Chelsea, who have since been punished for their actions. And in many other seasons covered by the Manchester City investigation, Tottenham Hotspur fell out of the top four. How different their recent history and future might have been had they consistently qualified for the Champions League.

All this makes it worthwhile to view these rules from a different perspective.

Diterjemahkan oleh AI.

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